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ABSTRACT 
Energizing the Future! Texas Synthetic Grid Geomagnetic Disturbances Analysis 
 
 
Shreya Mandal 
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
Texas A&M University 
 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Thomas Overbye 
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
Texas A&M University 
 
 
 The electrical grid is constantly evolving and it is essential to modify existing designs to 
assure preparation and safety for new threats such as geomagnetic disturbances (GMDs). It is 
necessary to maximize the functionality of the grid by utilizing the synthetic model of the Texas 
Interconnect. PowerWorld (visual software) was used to simulate the electrical grid and design 
modifications were integrated to the synthetic grid in order to withstand geomagnetic disturbance 
electric fields. It is necessary to conduct North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 
assessments to find the maximum effective geomagnetically induced current value for the worst 
case geoelectric field orientation. By simulating the disturbances on the power grid for the GMDs, 
the results will provide distinct solutions to threatening scenarios. It is essential to conduct such 
studies to predict the behavior of the grid to various natural phenomena and gather data to energize 
the future to create a more sustainable world. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In today’s society, power consumption is continuously increasing and the electric grid is 
constantly in use. The grid’s efficiency enables power distribution to homes, hospitals, businesses 
and companies. Electricity is universal and is used every day to entertain, provide information, and 
help individuals live more efficient lives. The electric power is symbolized as the heart of the 
world today. It would be devastating if the electric grid would be damaged due to natural disasters 
or hazardous threats.   
History  
 
 In March 1989, the entire province of Québec, Canada suffered an electrical power 
blackout [2] which was caused by a solar storm that lasted for twelve hours. This geomagnetic 
disturbance threat caused widespread outages. The Québec Grid collapsed and the solar storm also 
disrupted satellites in space for several hours. The aftermath of this event led to permanent damage 
of a transformer in New Jersey. The storm proved that individual transformers may be damaged 
from overheating. Approximately 9,450 MW of generation [3] was lost which caused a drastic 
drop of frequency at load center substations. Many utilities are considering geomagnetically 
induced current (GIC) measuring devices to be installed to receive the transformer’s reactive 
power consumption [3]. Due to these catastrophic events, necessary predictions and measures must 
be taken in the case of a super storm striking today’s power grids.  
Theory of Geomagnetic Disturbances  
 
 Geomagnetic Disturbances (GMDs) are caused by solar wind shock which affects the 
Earth’s magnetic field. Geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) are also caused by solar flares 
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ejected from the surface of the sun [4]. The changes of the magnetic field induce an electric field 
on the Earth. GMDs can severely disrupt operations of the electric grid by inducing various 
currents in the high voltage grid [4]. The impact is placed on transformers, communications and 
global positioning systems (GPS).  There is a major concern that GMD events may adversely affect 
the equipment used in the transmission and distribution of electric power [5]. 
 GMD events cause damage on transmission system assets [6] specifically the high voltage 
transformers. Additionally, the loss of reactive power leads to the potential for a voltage collapse 
[6]. The impact of GIC in the power flow can be formulated by solving the dc network: 𝐼 = 𝐺𝑉.	  
G represents the following: a real matrix with conductance values, conductance values that are 
determined by the parallel combination of three individual phases [6], includes substation 
grounding and neutral buses, and transformers that are modeled with the winding resistance to the 
substation neutral [6]. V represents the substation neutral dc voltages. For modeling these events, 
the GMD induced electric field variation can be viewed as dc voltage sources in the ground or as 
dc voltages in series with transmission lines. These dc voltage sources are represented in the I 
vector as Norton Equivalent currents. 
 In the past, GMD analysis tools were not readily available for power system engineers to 
use for assessments. It is clear that GMDs present a major problem to the electrical grid where 
large-scale blackouts lasting for months could occur due to voltage collapse or permanent 
transformer damage [4]. GIC values can be calculated using line resistance, substation geographic 
coordinates and grounding resistance, transformer configuration, and transformer coil winding 
resistances [6]. When GIC is integrated into a power flow analysis, the differences in reactive 
power losses and bus voltages can be analyzed to assess the risk of voltage instability and large-
scale voltage collapse [6]. By simulating the disturbances on the power grid for the GMDs, the 
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results will provide distinct solutions to various threating scenarios for the electric grid in order to 
create a resilient and secure future. 
North American Electricity Reliability Council (NERC) Work of 2012 
 
 NERC conducted a special reliability assessment and published an interim report titled: 
Effects of Geomagnetic disturbances on the Bulk Power System in February of 2012. In this report, 
NERC provides key information regarding that GMD events have demonstrated their ability to 
disrupt the normal operations [2] of the power grid. The storm interaction with Earth and 
transmission lines are initiated with a solar flare which are originated from coronal mass ejections 
(CME). The CME interacts with the Earth’s magnetic field and produces electrojets. The 
electrojets disturb the Earth’s magnetic field which ultimately induces a voltage potential at Earth’s 
surface [2]. This action produces GICs. The GICs interrupt the operations of power systems and 
may damage various equipment.  
 NERC explicitly states the two main risks of GICs entering the power system. The risks 
are the damage of transformers and the loss of reactive power support that could lead to voltage 
instability and power system collapse [2]. The report provides suggestions for power engineers to 
model bulk power systems for a future GMD event. The process is to determine the occurrence of 
the geomagnetic activity, calculate the electric fields experienced by the power system, and 
modeling the GIC produced [2]. By determining these factors, GMD characteristics are able to be 
measured and further analyzed to create optimized solutions. The February 2012 NERC report 
includes various strategies and recommendations to manage the effects of GMD events. The 
improvements on current simulation tools are important and crucial to investigate GMD impacts 
on the power grid.  
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS 
 
 The main research methodology was to simulate the vulnerability of the Texas Synthetic 
Grid (TSG) by the impact of solar storms. The TSG acts as a large scale realistic test system which 
allows different and extreme scenarios to be simulated on the Earth’s geomagnetic system. The 
advantage of using the TSG is that it provides a coordinate system platform to predict the data of 
threatening events. By using the TSG, changes can be made to test certain solutions for the case. 
The response of the TSG was captured by simulating GMD events. The simulations were 
conducted using PowerWorld [9], a visual software which enables the user to create various storm 
scenarios and analyze the response of the TSG. 
 In this study, the GIC Calculations tool was used and the calculation mode offered a 
field/voltage input option that was manipulated to simulate various solar storms. GIC calculations 
depend on the induced dc voltages in transmission lines, resistance of different system elements, 
and the various paths to the ground. For example, a simple GIC calculation can be computed by 
following Figure 1 [6]. In Figure 1, there are four buses and two substations. Bus 1 and Bus 2 are 
connected by a 765 kV line with a per phase resistance of 3 Ω. The grounded side of the coil for 
each of the transformers are 0.3 Ω. The substations’ grounding resistance is 0.2 Ω. Assuming that 
the substations are at the same latitude and separated by 150 km (east to west) and an electrical 
field of 1 V/km was applied in the east to west direction, the total induced voltage in the 
transmission line is 150 V [6]. By solving a dc circuit, the transmission line and transformers are 
calculated in parallel. The total three phase resistance is 1 Ω and each transformer resistance is 0.1 
Ω. Then, the previous resistance values are calculated with both of the substations’ grounding 
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resistance to provide the 𝐼'(),+,-./0 value in amps [6]. In Figure 1, the size and the direction of the 
brown arrows represent the direction and magnitude of the GIC flow [6]. 
 
Figure 1: GIC Example 
 After the GICs have been calculated, the transformer reactive power losses are determined. 
The linear relationship of the reactive power losses can be demonstrated in the following equation: 𝑄23// = 	𝑉45𝑘𝐼'(). 𝑄23// represents the related reactive power loss in Mvar.  𝑉45 is the terminal 
voltage measured in kV and 𝐼'()  is the per phase in the transformer measured in amps. The 
transformer specific constant is 𝑘. In this study, power flow is calculated in per unit so the equation 
is rewritten as   𝑄23// = 	𝑉,7𝐾𝐼'() . 𝑉,7 is the per unit voltage and 𝐾 has units Mvars/amp. 𝐼'()  
measures the current in the grounded coil [6]. 
 By simulating on the TSG, the model explored various parameters by calculating 
appropriate values for the system summary. The system summary displayed data for the total Mvar 
losses in a specified direction, total Mvar losses in a maximum direction, maximum direction in 
degrees, total Mvar losses in minimum direction, and minimum direction in degrees. Additionally, 
the GIC tool provides specific calculations for the areas, buses, generators, G-matrix, lines, line 
shunts, switched shunts, substations, and transformers for the case.  
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 The GMD induced electric fields must correspond to a simulated GMD event or storm 
scenario generated by a simulator [4]. The NERC TPL-007-2 provides various parameters for a 
benchmark GMD event which includes a geospatially uniform GMD where the electric field 
magnitude varies with local earth resistivity and geomagnetic latitude [4]. The system generated 
uniform electric field models and provided the option to manipulate the magnitude corresponding 
to the parameters found in the NERC TPL-007-2 assessment.  
The main concerns of this analysis to predict the storms are: 
1) Large Scale Blackout due to voltage collapse 
2) Permanent transformer damage due to overheating 
These concerns were evaluated by conducting various assessments using the NERC TPL-007-2 
Benchmark guide.  
NERC TPL-007-2  
 The NERC Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance 
Events or known as TPL-007-2 were used to abide the necessary requirements to analyze the GMD 
events in the various simulations. The benchmark evaluates various requirements which were 
necessary to consider to attain optimal data for the study.  
 The requirements cover planning coordinator information along with transmission planner 
documentation. There are eleven requirements in the NERC assessment for transmission system 
planned performance for geomagnetic disturbance events. The first task was to evaluate overall 
voltage per unit magnitude across the case by contouring the buses. The benchmark GMD 
vulnerability assessment begins with requirement four, which focuses on the system on peak load 
for at least one year within the near term transmission planning horizon and the system off peak 
load for at least one year within the near term transmission planning horizon. In this study, the 
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maximum effective GIC values for the worst case geoelectric field orientations were analyzed. 
The main goal was to visualize and simulate the geomagnetic events across the TSG and to observe 
which areas were affected.  
GIC Power Flow Modeling  
 The TSG was used as the synthetic power system model. Abiding by the parameters from 
the NERC TPL-007-2, two assessments were performed. The Benchmark GMD Vulnerability 
Assessment (based on Attachment 1) included the following conditions: reference maximum peak 
geoelectric field as 8 V/km and if the transformer GIC value is greater than 75 A, then a thermal 
heating analysis should be conducted. Similarly, the Supplemental GMD Vulnerability 
Assessment (based on Attachment 1) referred the following conditions: reference maximum peak 
geoelectric field as 12 V/km and if the transformer GIC value is greater than 85 A, then a thermal 
heating analysis should be conducted [10].  These assessments were set by the NERC as a standard. 
The simulations that were executed in this study implemented the peak values of 8 V/km and 12 
V/km without the scaling factors. By conducting these simulations, an extreme GMD event 
analysis was able to be performed and analyzed on a synthetic system. The transformers that have 
a greater GIC value than the standard conditions were further studied by observing the animated 
flow. This process was implemented by utilizing the One Line Diagram tool, and selecting the 
custom float option. The animated flow option offers the ability to visualize GIC flow through the 
transformers to determine appropriate mitigation strategies.  
 The requirements (Requirement 5- Requirement 6) specified in TPL-007-2 provided the 
GIC flow information for the thermal impact assessment of transformers. Requirement 5 states the 
maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation must be further 
analyzed for the benchmark GMD event [10].  Requirement 6 describes suggested actions and 
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supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICS [10]. Requirement 7 consists of developing a 
corrective action plan. These requirements were evaluated during the different storm simulations.  
 To visualize the storm, the contouring map option was used for different storm scenarios. 
The contouring map provided an overall voltage mapping of the case. The overall voltage contour 
and GIC animated flow provided key insight on the Texas Case to identify exact locations of 
vulnerability. The storms were simulated by changing the storm magnitude and the direction. The 
storm magnitudes were 3.11, 5, 8, and 12 V/km. The storm directions that were used were: 0 (east 
to west), 30, 45, 60 and 90 (north to south) degrees. The contour maps were a very important tool 
to use and pin point areas that have maximum GIC flowing creating a major threat to the power 
system.  
 In the GIC Analysis form, the GIC calculations were implemented into the power flow 
solution. To execute this condition, including GIC in the power flow must be selected to visualize 
the storm on the Texas case. After choosing the appropriate electric field model parameters and 
including GIC in the power flow were selected, the voltage contour was calculated and the 
animated GIC flow was initiated. The tables and results provided data that was calculated 
regarding the effect the GIC on areas, buses, generators, G-matrix, substations, lines, and 
transformers. 
 When modeling GMDs, there are two electric field approaches: uniform and non-uniform 
fields. In this study, the uniform field approach was integrated where the constant electric field is 
assumed and the maximum electric field can be changed along with the direction of the field. The 
calculation mode that was utilized was Single Snapshot. The Single Snapshot calculation offers to 
calculate the induced DC voltage in series with each transmission line at one time point. The 
network equations were calculated for the resulting DC network to the DC GIC currents for the 
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entire system [6]. This study evaluated the overall voltage distribution of the case, transformer 
damage, and a corrective action plan was constructed to assess the different storm scenarios. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS  
 
 The results are composed of various storm scenarios that were simulated with different 
magnitudes and directions. For each storm simulation, the overall voltage distribution was 
analyzed to identify locations with near voltage collapse as the electric field strength increased. 
After each storm simulation, the transformer per phase effective GIC values were evaluated. The 
exact locations of the transformers were investigated to see the animated GIC flow, and identify 
the maximum effective GIC values for the worst case geoelectric field orientation. Additionally, 
the system summaries were assessed.  
Benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment  
 The Benchmark GMD Vulnerability assessment’s reference geoelectric field amplitude of 
8 V/km was simulated in increasing storm directions from 0 to 90 degrees. As the storm direction 
increased, specific areas of the Texas case displayed regions of low voltages. Figure 2 depicts the 
the different storm directions and the region which is susceptible to voltage collapse that mostly 
occurs in Northeast Texas. When the storm direction is increased to 60 to 90 degrees, a blackout 
occurs. In this simulation, the worst case geoelectric field orientation before a blackout occurs is 
at 45 degrees. The advantage of visualizing the large scale system is that the actual locations of 
the damage can be assessed and confirmed with the transformer damage data.  
 
13 
 
 
Figure 2: Storm Direction at 8 V/km 
 
 In Figure 2, the storm direction was increased from 0 to 90 degrees and as each of the 
orientations change, the synthetic grid can be analyzed to find the problem areas to fix and avoid 
blackouts. To create these solutions, the transformer damage must be analyzed to evaluate the GIC 
values. The transformer data was evaluated for each of the different magnitudes and storm 
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directions. The three different magnitudes included 3.11 V/km, 5 V/km and 8 V/km for the first 
assessment. The first storm was investigated at 3.11 V/km and at 0 degrees. 
 
Figure 3: 3.11 V/km at 0 Degrees Transformer Data 
 In Figure 3, the Bus that suffered through the most GIC impact is Denton at 129.343 A per 
phase. Since, Denton had the highest value the area was further studied by zooming into the exact 
location in the case. Denton is located in Northeast Texas which showed the most visible impact 
by the storm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4 demonstrates the GIC animated flow at Denton. The size of the arrows represents 
the magnitude of the overall power flow. GICs flow along transmission lines and through 
Figure 4: DENTON Specific Location 
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transformer windings to ground wherever there is a present path for them to flow. When the area 
of Denton was analyzed, a key observation was noticed regarding the length of the transmission 
lines. The transmission lines were long and covered a lot of area which suggests that the GIC had 
an effective path to flow through and caused disturbances to the system. Due to this problem, a 
corrective action plan must be developed to mitigate the effects of GIC. As various simulations 
were conducted, the highest effective GIC value changed when the storm’s electrical field was 
3.11 V/km and the storm direction was 60 degrees.  
 
Figure 5: 3.11 V/km at 60 Degrees Transformer Data 
 
 
Figure 6: ODESSA Specific Location  
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 Figure 5 and Figure 6 display the simulated storm at 3.11 V/km with 60 degrees storm 
direction. The highest GIC value changed from Denton to Odessa. Denton still had a high GIC 
value of 114.130 A per phase but Odessa had the highest value at 122.48 A. Figure 5 showed that 
the overall GIC animated flow for the system at the specific location. Odessa is located in 
Northwest Texas which displays a low voltage region at 3.11 V/km seen in Figure 6. The 
increasing electric field strength at 60 degrees can be seen in Figure 7. The voltage contouring 
maps help visualize the areas that would have the most chance of collapsing when a storm occurs.  
 
 
Figure 7: Increasing Field Strength at (60 degrees) 
 
 In this case, the transformer damage was evaluated and a solution to help minimize the 
problem would be to set up relay settings. By setting up the relay settings, the transformers would 
be tripped at certain times to continue appropriate power flow across the system. It is clear that the 
storm conditions selected of 8 V/km in all of the 0 to 90 degree events are very critical towards 
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reliability violations and voltage collapse. The first blackout occurred at the 8 V/km and 60 degree 
directional storm.  
 Additionally, 5 V/km at 0 and 60 degrees’ storms were assessed and the same areas were 
effected based on the GIC values. Both Denton and Odessa areas had the highest GIC value and 
compared to the 3.11 V/km storm, the values increased to 207.95 A and 196.58 A respectively 
(Figures 8 and 9). It was important to also evaluate the other areas such as Galveston, and San 
Marcos to locate the vulnerability. As the geoelectric field strength increased, the transformer GIC 
values significantly increased at the same areas. The increased values determine the necessity to 
create strategies to limit GIC flows.  
 
Figure 8: 5 V/km at 0 Degrees Transformer Data 
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Figure 9: 5 V/km at 60 degrees Transformer Data 
 Figure 10 and 11 exhibit the GIC values of the transformers per phase which are extremely 
high and dangerous for a system to function. The total system is overloaded with reactive power 
when GIC is present. When the voltage drops, the capacitors are charged and discharged which 
are connected to various breakers and relays. As GIC flows through the system, transformers create 
different even and odd harmonics. These harmonics create a negative impact on the relays. Due to 
this impact, the relays do not function properly and disrupt the breakers’ proper operation. GMD 
events truly limit the power transfer capability and cause major power outages and power loss.  
 
Figure 10: 8 V/km at 0 degrees Transformer data 
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Figure 11: 8 V/km at 60 degrees (Blackout) Transformer data 
Supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment  
 The supplemental GMD study was conducted using the peak geoelectric field at 12 
V/km. When the storm was simulated at 0 degrees, the system could no longer supply the load 
resulting in a blackout.  
 
Figure 12: 12 V/km at 0 Degrees (Blackout) 
 Figure 12 truly shows the overall voltage drop and collapse which was spread across all of 
Texas. Southern Texas was the only location that did not get fully impacted by the storm. Northeast 
Texas was severely disrupted and Figure 13 depicts very high GIC values of the transformers per 
phase at 499.07 A at Denton. 
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Figure 13: 12 V/km at 0 degrees Transformer data 
 The system summaries (Figure 14) were assessed for each storm scenario specifically at 
60 degrees. The data is associated with 60 degrees because it was the specific storm direction that 
caused the blackout at 8 V/km. The system summaries were evaluated for 3.11 V/km, 5 V/km, and 
8 V/km. The key relationship that was observed was that the total Mvar losses in the specified 
direction increased, as the storm direction and electrical field strength were increased. 
 
Figure 14: System Summaries for Storms 
 
Corrective Action Plan/ Mitigation Strategies 
 Due to the storm impact on the system, it was important to develop ideas for a corrective 
action plan to minimize the overall power loss. GICs cause transformer heating and increased 
transformer reactive power losses. To mitigate the effect, DC current blocking devices should be 
implemented for protection.  Current GIC blocking devices consists of capacitive or resistive 
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circuits placed at the ground connection of transformers [11]. Capacitors that are placed in series 
on a transmission line block GICs on the lines. The blocking devices function by disconnecting 
the transformer neutral from the substation neutral.  
 
Figure 15: GIC Blocking Approach 
 Figure 15 shows that the GIC values for the transformers decreased after blocking 11 of 
the buses. The buses included Odessa, Stephenville, Copperas Cove, Laredo, San Antonio, Killeen 
San Marcos, Denton, Mansfield, and Presidio. These buses were chosen because previously to the 
blocking, they had the highest GIC values for the transformers.  
 The Mvar losses are important to consider when planning to place the blocking device. The 
blocking device principle goal is to inhibit the GIC from entering the transformer. In previous 
research studies, implementing blocking devices benefited the system by decreasing the total 
demand on the system [11]. The blocking device approach should be implemented since it 
mitigates the total system wide reactive power losses. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Visualizing the GIC flow was very effective in this study and simulating the storm 
scenarios with different magnitudes provided a range of various worst geoelectric storm cases. 
Each storm direction presented a new scenario for a power system engineer to analyze using the 
system summary to prepare for future disasters. 
Future Optimized Solutions 
 Based on the findings presented, GMD events truly cause damage and interrupt power 
system operations. The geographic locations of the GIC flow were found and were analyzed as the 
storm directions varied. It is seen that in the north part of Texas was the most affected. This visual 
representation of the current flow helps create a solution when a geomagnetic storm occurs. The 
north part of Texas would not have sufficient power to withstand normal grid operations. In that 
case, implementing a blocking device at specific transformers with the highest GIC values could 
be a solution.  
 In the future, more analysis will be conducted such as creating algorithms to add blocking 
devices. The blocking devices could be placed at the exact transformers that are the most 
vulnerable, and the GIC would not flow into those transformers. The GIC would try to find another 
path. This path would be to the other transformers that are not susceptible to the damage. Overall, 
this study exemplifies the importance to analyze different storm scenarios and to create a resilient 
grid for potential power deficiencies to occur in the future.   
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